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Abstract 
The paper examines the relationship between the political system and the public administration 
modernization in the Hungarian transition. Its intention is to point out that there are various 
shortcuts and bottlenecks of the Hungarian modernization and the cumulative impacts of these 
deficiencies have caused characteristic difference of the Hungarian modernization trajectory 
from the typical Western trajectories. 
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1 Introduction 
In Hungary we experienced and still experience an incomplete trajectory. In the first stage a 
legal-institutional framework was set up of a Rechtsstaat with deficiencies in the practice. In 
the second stage from the three different contracts – which are the core of the modernization 
process in the EU countries (contractual based relationship between the regulative and service 
delivery function; contracting out for the involvement of private enterprises and civil society 
organizations in the service provision; Citizen’s Charter for the legitimation of the reform steps 
in the society) – only contracting out has applied in the Hungarian practice. Citizens have been 
not empowered and even now no Citizen’s Charter can be seen on the horizon. 
In the third stage the administrative principles of the European Administrative Space (EAS) 
have been introduced but in an unbalanced way and the requirements of the increase of 
economic competitiveness were only partially implemented. These external requirements of 
the EU could be accomplished only with deficiencies, because when Hungary entered the EU 
cumulative deficiencies could be experienced in the public administration modernization. 
By now – in the stage of a desired consolidation – the crucial issue is that which type of state 
will be consolidated: a Neo-Weberian or a Neo-patrimonial state? 
It is evident that the transition from command to market economy and from totalitarian state 
to a pluralist state, multiparty democracy is not only a transition in itself but rather a long 
process of transformation and it requires essential reforms in the basic functions and 
institutions of the state (König, 1992), and it requires the emergence or re-emergence of a 
civil society as well. 
First of all we have to make a clear distinction between transition and transformation. The 
term “transition” refers to the beginning and the completion of a historical process. In that 
sense the CEE countries have had a starting point, a party-state or a state-party system and in 
the coming 30-40 years they should manage a perfection of a market economy system and 
liberal democracy. 
The term “transformation” covers the essential changes in the economy, society, and politics 
in the process. These transformation and transition processes have emerged on various 
historical background. There were differences in the starting point of the transition among the 
CEE countries and these differences have been deepened in the course of transition. 
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It means that you can find on one edge of the continuum functioning market economies and 
liberal democracies while on the other edge of the continuum liberal democracy is not a real-
existing system but an instrument for the international legitimation of political systems which 
is more an enlightened absolutism than a liberal democracy. The relationship among them can 
be characterised as a “diverging convergence”. 
It is the reason why the Hungarian experiments have to be carefully applied to all CEE 
countries. Perhaps the reform and modernization processes of the new EU member and 
accession states from the region are more or less similar to the Hungarian pattern. For the other 
countries in the region this pattern is less relevant and in a few cases the development of liberal 
democracy would threaten the political stability in these countries. 
In Hungary it is convenient to break up the process of administrative reform into various 
phases. Three phases are distinguished from each other: the first lasting from 1989 to 1994, 
the second from 1995 to 2003, and the third from 2004 to the present time. 
2 The first phase of modernization and its international context (1989-
1994) 
In the first period the basic task was the creation of a strong legal state. But the task was not so 
simple because in the European tradition there were three different Rechtsstaat models. 
According to Walter Kirkert the basic difference between the Napoleonic and German models 
is the following: “The Napoleonic state model, in which the nation state is united and the state 
serves the general interest, the administration is centralised, hierarchical, uniform, accountable 
and controlled, and state officials are highly trained and qualified, and organised in 
professional ‘corps’, also formed the foundation of Mediterranean states like Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. The German Rechtsstaat tradition can be recognised in countries like Austria. The 
main difference between the legalistic Napoleonic and the German Rechtsstaat model is that 
the Prussian state formation was not based on a revolutionary abolishment of monarchy by the 
bourgeoisie, but on the hegemony of the Prussian elite, in particular the ‘Iron Chancellor’, 
Bismarck. The nineteenth-century German idea of Rechtsstaat meant that the sovereign was to 
be bound by laws and rules, which were to be equally and fairly applied to all state subjects, 
and that judges and administrators, were to be neutral. Contrary to the French principe de 
legalité, in which the law is the expression of the volonté générale, of the people (Ziller, 2003), 
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in Prussia and Habsburg Austria the emperors remained in absolute power. Parliamentary 
democracy was only established in Germany after the First World War (Kickert, 2008. p. 5-6). 
The third model is the liberal constitutional Rechtsstaat established in the twentieth century in 
many West-European countries. According to Kickert “The establishment of the Rechtsstaat 
also marked the beginning of modern professional bureaucracy. State officials transformed 
from personal servants of the king into servants of the impersonal state. They became properly 
educated and trained professionals with the proper expertise, they fulfilled an official, formally 
described task, held a formal and protected life-long position, with regular salary and pension. 
The ideal-type of bureaucracy (Weber, 1922) was born (Kickert, 2008. p. 6). 
What type of Rechtsstaat model was established in Hungary? The Napoleonic model can be 
excluded because the authoritarian system was not abolished on a revolutionary way. The 
Hungarian ambition and intention was to create a liberal constitutional Rechtsstaat based on 
the primacy of the law. Legal sources should be the basis of administrative actions 
implemented by a modern professional bureaucracy. In spite of the fact that Hungary followed 
the German Rechtsstaat model in the period of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy there were no 
attempts for its renewal (Hajnal-Jenei, 2008. p. 211-212). By now it turned out that serious 
deficiencies are in the implementation of the Rechtsstaat model. Rechtsstaat requires the 
separation of the there basic power branches; the legislative, executive and judicial institutions. 
In Hungary the separation of judiciary from the two other power branches is not completed 
even by now. 
The courts are influenced by the executive on different ways; for instance in their agenda 
setting and for slowing down judicial process. The extent and the forms of arbitrary actions is 
also an Achilles heel of the system. Politicians and bureaucrats are not demarcated in the 
commitment of bribery and corruption. Sometimes elected politicians are the initiator. 
Sometimes it is a bottom up corruption when low level civil servant must give a certain share 
for their principal. But top-town corruption also occurs quite frequently when top level civil 
servants have to buy silence of the others. In Hungary one kilometre highway costs the double 
amount of money than in Croatia. However it is well-known that Hungarian highways are built 
on the great Hungarian plain and the Croatian highways are built in hilly regions. The 
corruption connected to public procurement and later on to PPP contracts proves that the 
autonomy of the public administration is limited and it is dependent from the leaders of the 
political parties. 
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Further on democracy employs police and armed forces to guarantee internal and external 
security. But just recently Hungarian citizens could observe and experience arbitrary actions of 
the police and other law enforcement bodies in the limitation of their basic freedom rights 
(freedom of speech, right of assembly). The way how Rechtsstaat was established in Hungary 
had a controversial impact to the autonomy of public administration. In the beginning 
autonomy was decreased, even limited arguing that the bureaucracy served the previous 
authoritarian power. But bureaucracy played a controversial role in the crisis of the previous 
political system. In the first place it really was the executive part of the power, but on the other 
hand, based on its increasing autonomy, acted independently from the party system. This 
independence was declared in a critical phase of the transition in May 1989 and it was the main 
guarantee for a peaceful and consensus-based Hungarian transition. 
After 1990 the new political parties not only restricted the autonomy of the public 
administration, but also politicized the activities of the bureaucracy. The result of the impact 
of the new parties was a decrease in the professionalism of bureaucracy. 
It means that the legal-rational principle of the Weberian theory on bureaucracy was only 
partly accomplished. It turned out that no imitation of any Western models is possible, 
because of the impact of the Byzantine historical heritage. It resulted in that the legal- 
institutional framework was set up, but the political behaviour was not adequate to the 
framework and it caused serious deficiencies. 
3 The second phase of modernization and its international context (1995-
2003) 
Democratic legitimacy has two components: legal certainty and efficiency. The main issue in 
the first phase was to create legal certainty and the first phase was not completed when the 
second phase had to begin. The increase of the performance level of the economy and the 
public sector became an external requirement of Europeanization. The improvement of 
infrastructure, the quality of public services, and the performance of public administration 
became key long-term factors of economic recovery and modernization. 
Institutional capacity building became the core requirement, and public management reforms 
were the answers to the challenge. According to the typology of Pollitt-Bouckaert (Pollitt-
Bouckaert, 2002) public management reforms in Hungary had begun on the modernising 
trajectory in 1990. In the mid-1990s a shift has begun from the modernising because of the 
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weakness of the legal state. Then the accession to the European Union produced an external 
constraint to reinforce legalism, and strengthen effectiveness at the same time. The 
cumulative deficiencies were confronted with new waves external requirements and the result 
was a somehow chaotic situation. 
Hungary has had an incomplete trajectory in an international perspective. From the three 
different contracts (contractual based relationship between the regulative and service delivery 
functions; contracting out for quality improvement; Citizen’s Charter) only contracting out is 
applied in the Hungarian practice. The steering and rowing functions were not uncoupled. The 
day to day actions of the public agencies were not based on contracts between regulation and 
service provision. Only a performance appraisal system has been prepared without creating the 
opportunity for a correct performance measurement.  
The consequence was that public agencies could not compete in the poorly regulated market of 
service delivery with private enterprises. No transparent mechanisms of accountability were 
built up for civil monitoring. Citizens were not empowered. No Citizen’s Charter could and 
can be seen on the horizon. 
The state monopoly is being replaced with private monopoly. In a county (where the ruling 
coalition has majority in the county assembly) the hospitals have been contracted out. There 
are four hospitals in the county. Three of them are already in the hands of a private firm. (In 
this “private firm” leading officials from the government are interested in investments.) This 
firm has made a bid for the fourth hospital with the support of the county assembly. The capital 
of the county – where the hospital is located – resists. Let us suppose that the private firm will 
win and control the fourth hospital as well. Who will compete with whom? How can the public 
control them? Will the regulative power of the government be efficient? 
4 The third phase of modernization and its international context (2004- ) 
In 2004 Hungary was prepared for the EU membership and with this membership a new phase 
has begun. The main functions of the public administration were and are to consolidate 
• a functioning market economy, 
• a stable liberal democracy, 
• and to improve economic competitiveness. 
8 György Jenei   
 
In the third phase consolidation became the key word. There are many pressures and 
challenges facing public administration. For instance people are losing confidence in all 
institutions, while at the same time every institution is faced with pressures on its resources 
and budgets. There is also a continuing push for more "direct" democracy as well as more 
opportunities for participation. These trends are accompanied by decreasing respect for 
traditional instruments of "representative" democracy and public agencies are already viewed 
with considerable scepticism (Jenei, 1999). Under these circumstances, reacting in an 
oppressive way, or trying to minimise problems creates a decrease in the credibility of public 
administration.  
Nevertheless – especially in the last years – constant efforts were made to produce some kind 
of visible results in creating a customer-friendly administrative service, with introducing the 
one-stop system or implementing shop e-government measures. However, there are strong 
indicators showing that experiments with the application management techniques were failed, 
because the very basic classical bureaucratic virtues are often missing from large segments of 
the central government machinery. For example, basic coordination and information tasks are 
not carried out, and structures and processes are often largely chaotic and anarchistic, 
reflecting the temporary interests and aspirations of different, conflicting (micro-) political and, 
more typically, personal power centres. Moreover, even the most basic lines and mechanisms 
of bureaucratic accountability are often missing on multiple levels of the system (See Hajnal-
Jenei, 2008).  
Moreover the reform efforts are only slogans and in the reality they are not reforms, but 
actions or reactions under external and internal pressure. It was a cut back in the civil service 
because of financial constraints and it was and is called reform. But the name is misleading. 
This process does not meet the term “reform”used in EU countries, because it is not led by a 
strategic vision, and the actions are not legitimised by the civil society. There are neither 
participative nor civil dialogues. The administrative principles of the European 
Administartive Space (EAS) are only partly implemented. In an international comparison the 
following conclusions can be drawn. 
4.1 Representative versus participative democracy 
The democratic political system in Hungary is in the stage of a representative democracy now. 
I would add that a special version of representative democracy has been implemented in 
Hungary. In this version the party leaders supposed to be charismatic and democracy means 
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for the citizens a regular participation in the voting process. And nothing else! It is based on a 
simplified version of the theory of Schumpeter emphasizing the following component in 
defining democracy: “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote” (Schumpeter, 1947. p. 269).  
There are two problems with the Hungarian version. Firstly strong social groups of the 
Hungarians do not accept it. The public opinion polls show a frightening decline in the 
personal prestige of the politicians. Very limited confidence exits in the political institutions 
and in the public agencies anymore. (Exceptions are a few local politicians, among them even 
city mayors as well.) This level of mistrust endangers the stability of the system.  
This political orientation can be characterised with the instruction of a party leader. It was 
given in a county party meeting in the 2006 election campaign. The very essence of the 
instruction was that “the basic principle what we have to follow that two functional illiterate 
matter more than a Nobel Prize winner. They have two votes compared to one”. 
This statement has a logic. But it does not fit to the value orientation of strong social groups 
and secondly it does not meet the requirements of increasing the economic competitiveness of 
the country. It has become quite evident by now that the economic competitiveness of the 
country depends on such factors as the quality of public service provision, the performance 
level of public trust in the public agencies, the openness, transparency, predictability, reliability 
and accountability of the public sector. The main problem is that the current tasks of the public 
sector modernization require a post-parliamentary democracy, in the terms of the EU a 
participative democracy.  
But in Hungary participative democracy is the only a demand of the trade unions and of 
several civil society organisations. There are ongoing efforts for organising referenda against 
the government. In this special situation direct democracy is applied because of the lack of 
participative democracy, because it is the only – and costly – opportunity for pressure groups 
to express their criticism or resistance to governance.  
In a comparative perspective we can raise the question: What model of democracy has 
emerged in Hungary? Definitely it can not be described with the terms of liberal democracy. 
The very essence of this model of democracy is the widespread political participation, the 
direct and active involvement of citizens as decision makers in public policy making. The 
Hungarian model does not meet with these criteria, because the institutional mechanisms of 
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participative involvement either have not been set up (mechanisms of civil dialogue) or 
however they are established, but they do not function in the day to day practice of policy 
making (mechanisms of social dialogue). 
The Hungarian model is somewhat similar to the representative democracy when regular 
competitive elections are the core of the political system. But with deviations. The parties in 
Hungary are not only competitors, but they created a polarisation in the competition which 
resulted in a fragmentation in the party system and a lack of trust toward the state and a mutual 
one inside the society. 
The Hungarian democracy is in a deadlock situation. The integrative political organizations, 
the pressure groups and the civil society organizations are not able to force the parties moving 
out from this deadlock of fragmentation. The Hungarian democracy has an unbalanced 
institutional background. The centrifugal forces (parties) have essentially more strength then 
the centripetal, integrative forces (trade-unions, pressure groups, civil society organizations). 
Even sometimes these centripetal, integrative forces only imitate their socio-political functions, 
because some of them were created by parties and therefore they are extended arms of various 
parties. 
The Hungarian model is far away from the current forms of modern democracies. In this model 
of democracy the role of social groups is much greater than in a representative democracy. In 
these participative democracies pressure groups have grown up alongside the formal 
institutions of government and political system. They developed a bargaining power and 
governments and parties had to seek the consent and cooperation with these pressure groups. 
Sometimes this model is called “post-parliamentary democracy”, in which decisions are 
negotiated between public agencies and pressure groups. 
4.2 Lack of reforms in public policy making 
The second reason is that public management reforms are not coupled with reforms in policy 
making. In 2005 OECD published an analysis and evaluation on the results and problems and 
on the innovative efforts (OECD, 2005). 
Measuring on the criteria of this overview the main deficiencies of the Hungarian public sector 
some critical points can be found: 
• The openness of the government is on the traditional level. No progress has been made in 
transparency, accessibility and responsiveness. 
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• Performance management and budgeting has not been implemented in a series of public 
agencies. 
• Public policy making exists only as a web of actions without a relevant strategy. We can 
speak about strategic management mainly on the local level. 
• Progress was made in the efficiency of public agencies, but the implementation of 
effectiveness is only sporadic. 
• There is a widespread abuse and mismanagement of the market type mechanisms. 
• The core issue has to be solved is the adaptation to the changing needs of social groups and 
maintaining coherence of public policy and continuity of governance values at the same 
time.  
4.3 Weaknesses in professionalism among civil servants 
The relationship between politicians and civil servants is not consolidated. It means that every 
change in the coalition – which happens quite frequently in Hungary – had an impact on the 
composition of public administration on the top and the middle levels. It was the main obstacle 
of building up a neutral bureaucracy based on professional expertise. Party affiliation mattered 
more in the nomination of top– and middle level bureaucrats. 
The process has begun already in 1990 when top level technocrats were ousted from the 
government. In spite of the fact that their attitude was basically loyal to the new government, 
following the good old slogan originated from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: 
“Maul halten und weiter dienen” (Shut up! And do serve further!) 
This procedure was repeated every four years from that time on. Unfortunately there was an 
exchange in the governing position in almost every election. It was the result of a series of 
punishment votes and the opposition forces always emptied not only the key positions, but the 
mid-level positions as well. They had to pay out their supporters of the previous election 
campaign. The ideology was: “democracy is a learning process”. The problem was that they 
repeatedly learned, the public paid the costs, and a lot of the new leaders were weak, hopeless 
cases. It resulted in a decline in the professional expertise of civil servants. Sometimes they 
identify themselves as independent, but the question of the public for them: “On which side are 
you independent?” 
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The situation is somewhat better on the local level. Either in cities or in villages continuity can 
be experienced. It is favourable for the development of professional expertise. But in the 
current situation the relationship between politics and administration is unstable and over-
politisized. In Hungary it is also relevant what Verheijen and Rabrenovic pointed out on the 
CEE level and which is quoted by Meyer-Sahling (Meyer-Sahling 2008): “ The prevailing 
pattern is still the (…) civil service changing with each election or, in worse cases with each 
government reshuffles”(Verheijen and Rabrenovic, 2001:441). 
Politicization of public administration is also characteristic for Western democracies (Goetz 
2001), but in a comparative perspective the Hungarian practice is different from the prevailing 
modes of politicization in Western democracies (Meyer-Sahling, 2008:2). The main 
differences are as follows: 
• personnel turnover is essentially higher then the international standards after every elections, 
• new appointees have been recruited from outside mainly based on their political affiliation 
rather then from the public agencies, 
• governments appoint officials who are “returnees” as Meyer-Sahling argues “in the sense 
that they work in senior administrative ranks under governments of the same political 
couleur, leave when a government is formed by parties of the opposite political spectrum, but 
return to senior ranks with “their bloc of parties” after having bridged the out-of-office 
period in the private sector, academia or at a political party” (Meyer-Sahling, 2008:2). 
In Hungary a partisan politicization has emerged which is different from the other modes of 
politicization, namely the non-politicization, and the bounded politicization. This mode is the 
heritage of the authoritarian system where the politicization of public administration was 
strong and dominant. It was a one-party system, in which the career paths were merged among 
the leading positions of the party, of the public administration and of the economic enterprises. 
This party dominance survived the authoritarian system, but in a modified form. In the new 
multi party systems the “ancient mode” of politicization has been preserved and it was taken 
over by the newly established parties as well. 
An additional problem is the relation among the various elites. What type of elite theory is 
relevant for the Hungarian political and administrative developments? In modern democracies 
political elites are composed of political party leaders in the government and in opposition, of 
high ranking civil servants, military leaders, leaders of economic enterprises, and sometimes of 
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aristocracy and royal house. There are different kinds of elites and their position is partly 
related to the development of large-scale organizations. 
Liberal democracy operates in the modern state through the interactions between the various 
elites and the bureaucratic elite between the elections, and trough the competition between 
party elites in the regular election period. It is the very essence of democratic elitism, which 
means competition, but also circulation and replacement, among the elites. In Hungary the 
relationship between the elites is unbalanced. The system of “Checks and balances” is not 
implemented. The behaviour of the political elites is similar to a ruling class behaviour. This 
means that there is a lack of compromise oriented political culture in the way how party 
coalitions govern. 
The second bottleneck is the weakness of other elites compared to the party elites. Neutral, 
independent bureaucracy does not exist at all in Hungary. Top and middle management of 
public agencies have been directly influenced by the governing parties very frequently. Civil 
society organisations – in many cases – are supported financially, based on their party 
commitments. 
The signs of clientelism are quite transparent. It is also a deadlock and no forces can be 
observed on the horizon with the ability to push the current situation into the direction of 
democratic elitism. The emergence of a neo-patrimonial alternative is a real danger. 
5. Conclusions 
Even in the EU countries there are tensions between the administrative principles. There is a 
broadly discussed tension between the principles of professional integrity and professional 
loyalty. And a well-known consequence of customer orientation, quality improvement and 
application of management techniques is the tension between legalism and managerialism. 
But in the EU the development of the “Rule of Law” and the introduction of “Public 
Management Reforms” was a sequential process.  
Compared to this the essential difference in Hungary was, that only in the early l99O’s the 
legal and organizational framework of a “Rechtsstaat” was established and shortly after this 
they have also got the challenge of introducing managerial methods and techniques in the 
public sector. Basically the development of the “Rule of Law” and of the “New Public 
Management” has become a parallel process. The result was multiplied defiency and 
deviation from any Western patterns. 
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Creating a legal – organizational framework for a “Rechtsstaat” does not mean that it is 
already a functioning legal state based on Weberian principles. But without a functioning 
Weberian democratic system, without regulative and monitoring power of the state the initial 
steps of “Public Management Reforms” result in uncertainties and deviations in the legal state 
and even strengthen corruption.  
On the other hand without introducing the quality models the CEE countries cannot increase 
the competitiveness of the public sector which is an essential component of the economic, 
social and political modernization processes of these countries. 
Are we really in the trap situation? Is it a way out from this post-accession crisis (Ágh, 2008)? 
The only solution is that Hungary must not try to avoid the Weberian phase of development. 
A functioning Rechtsstaat is a necessity in the course of modernization but you have to add to 
this development the application and implementation of the western quality models as well. 
You need a balanced position and public administration needs a stable political background 
and strong consensus of the political parties in supporting this process. 
A Neo-Weberian State became the requirement without having a completed Weberian state, 
because it is the only solution for providing a synthesis between legalism and managerialism. 
It is the new constraint. 
A Neo-Weberian State, in which governmental actions are based on the Rule of Law, in 
which private enterprises are involved for competing quality in the service delivery, and in 
which civil society organizations have a full range involvement in public policy making, from 
decision making to service provision. 
As for Hungary is concerned: only the Neo-Weberian State means that the light at the end of 
the tunnel are in sight and without this synthesis we are just running in a long tunnel further 
multiplying the deficiencies of modernization.  
There is no doubt: in a normative approach Neo-Weberian State would be the optimal 
solution. But taking into consideration the multiplied deficiencies either of the legal state or of 
the public management reforms, and the controversies between the rhetoric and the actions of 
reform efforts another alternative appears on the horizon: the new-patrimonial state.  
It is sure that new-patrimonial alternative would be a dead-end street. Now Hungary is just at 
the entrance of this dead-end street. The only guarantee not to enter in this street is the 
strengthening of civil sector and its organisations. 
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Hungarian politicians divide society into a polar spectrum containing marketplace on the one 
side and government on the other side. In this approach civil society is dependent from these 
two centres. But we need an approach in which market economy, government and civil 
society are parts of a three-legged chair. The first leg creates market capital, he second one 
creates public capital and the third one creates social capital. Civil society has to develop to a 
third, independent force in public policy making and then the Hungarian perspective is a Neo-
Weberian synthesis and not a combined mistake of a neo-patrimonial state. 
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